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LEXISNEXIS SUMMARY: 
... The best guesses of how much state and local governments spent at this time are less than one and a half times as 
much as the national government, making total spending at all levels of government at most 5 percent of national 
income. ... The three primary ways of paying for government expenditures are (1) current taxes; (2) government 
borrowing, which is equivalent to future taxes, since even if the government's debt is never paid off, the present value of 
all future interest payments is roughly equal to the total value of the debt; and (3) the issuing of money, which generates 
inflation and an implicit tax on people's cash balances, as money's purchasing power declines. ... The Civil War's 
unprecedented expenditures struck at the very moment that the Union's anticipated revenues fell. ... The latter fact 
meant that he had a strong dislike for governmental control of the economy; he despised government debt, paper 
money, and internal taxes. ... The interest alone on this debt commanded about 40 percent of the central government's 
outlays into the mid-1870s (as compared with less than 10 percent today). ... Finance of the American Revolution 
stands as a precursor to Confederate finance, with a similar low level of formal taxation (6 percent), heavy reliance on 
seigniorage (75 percent), and resulting hyperinflation. ... Greenbacks were simple fiat money, printed by the Treasury 
and used directly to make government purchases. ... It peaked at $ 2.3 trillion in December 2008, as the Treasury 
loaned over half a trillion of newly borrowed money to the Fed, which turned around and loaned it to foreign central 
banks through currency swaps. ... This seemingly technical change not only gives banks an incentive to just hold 
reserves rather than loan them out - thereby dampening increases in bank created money and in the price level - but it 
also essentially converts reserves into more government debt. 
TEXT: 
[*591] 
Randolph Bourne was a young Progressive radical during World War I. n1 Viewing the grotesque excesses of 
Woodrow Wilson's wartime administration, he wrote an essay in which he coined the maxim: "War is the health of the 
State." n2 The essay was only published posthumously, because Bourne himself became a victim of the war-induced flu 
epidemic. n3 
Economists and historians have confirmed the validity of Bourne's maxim in two major respects. First, during war 
itself, there is a surge in government power, as it increases in scope, size, and intrusiveness. n4 The war brings about 
higher taxes, wider conscription, more regulation of the economy, and suppression of civil liberties. n5 Governments 
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tend to spend more on war and preparing for war than on anything else. n6 Indeed, prior to the advent of the modern 
welfare State in the twentieth century, governments usually spent more on war and preparing for war than all other 
things combined. n7 The State was essentially a war making institution that did a few other things on the side. n8 
[*592] The second respect in which "war is the health of the State" is what Robert Higgs and other economic 
historians have identified as the postwar ratchet effect. n9 After the war ends, there is demobilization with some cut back 
in taxes, conscription, regulation, and restrictions on civil liberties, but governments rarely return to their prewar size 
and power. n10 The State has assumed new functions and exercised new prerogatives that continue long after the 
fighting is over. n11 In what follows we will survey how these two phenomena apply generally to government finance 
throughout the history of the United States, then look specifically and in detail at Civil War finance, make some 
comparisons with the financing of other major American wars, and finally consider the relevance of these observations 
for today's War on Terror and financial crisis. 
I. War and U.S. Government Finance 
Figure 1 shows total spending of the U.S. government as a percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) from 1792 to the 
present. By using the percentage of GDP, the graph adjusts spending for three factors: (a) any price inflation or 
deflation; (b) population growth; and (c) the growth of people's real incomes. If the percentage goes up, that means that 
real government spending per person is rising faster than the economy's output. In other words, more of people's 
incomes is going to the national government and less to the private sector (or in this case, to other levels of 
government). n12 
[*593] 
[SEE FIGURE 1 IN ORIGINAL] 
Fig. 1 
The graph shows both major peaks and minor peaks during wars. If one looks closely, one can discern the impact of the 
War of 1812, the Mexican War (1846-1848), and the Spanish-American War (1898). But the Civil War (1861-1865), 
World War I (1914-1918), and World War II (1939-1945) all induce major peaks in national outlays. Notice also the 
postwar ratchet effect. n13 Thus, after the Civil War peak of around 13 percent of GDP, the postwar ratchet leaves 
government spending 50 percent higher than its prewar level. Indeed, federal expenditures even decline slightly as a 
percent of GDP during the Progressive Era of government activism in the early twentieth century. The World War I 
ratchet nearly doubles national outlays, from about 2.5 percent of GDP prior to the war to 5 percent of GDP afterwards, 
despite the alleged Republican retrenchment of the nineteen twenties. n14 
President Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal caused another doubling of federal expenditures during the thirties. n15 
This peacetime increase is particularly anomalous because prior to the Great Depression, the general rule, not only in 
the U.S. but elsewhere in the industrial world, was for governments to rein in spending during depressions and 
recessions. The fiscal impact of the Great Depression, however, is entirely dwarfed by the [*594] expenditure hike 
during World War II. Even a brief post-World War II retrenchment never brings spending back to its New Deal level, 
and then the Korean (1950-1953) and Cold Wars stabilized national outlays at approximately twice that level. 
Figure 1 admittedly omits any expenditures by state and local governments. Figure 2 adjusts for that omission 
beginning at the turn of the twentieth century. n16 Unfortunately, we have no precise figures on how much state and 
local governments within the U.S. spent during the nineteenth century. Nonetheless, once we can add this spending, the 
overall pattern does not change. We still observe wartime peaks and postwar ratchets. Moreover, the impact of the New 
Deal is dampened a bit. Prior to the thirties, state and local governments spent up to twice as much as the national 
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government. The New Deal made federal expenditures greater than those of state and local governments combined, and 
after World War II the pre-New Deal proportion is sometimes completely reversed, with federal expenditures fully 
twice as great. n17 In short, part of the increase in federal spending during the administrations of President Roosevelt 
really represented a change of the locus of spending away from the state and local level. 
[SEE FIGURE 2 IN ORIGINAL] 
Fig. 2 
Prior to the American Civil War, the central government had miniscule peacetime budgets. n18 The highest annual 
outlays reached was $ 74.2 million in 1858. n19 That translates into about [*595] $ 1.5 billion in today's (2009) prices. 
n20 Adjusting for population, the government in Washington was spending approximately $ 2.50 per person in 1858, or 
the equivalent of $ 50 per person per year today. n21 This was less than 2 percent of GDP. The best guesses of how 
much state and local governments spent at this time are less than one and a half times as much as the national 
government, making total spending at all levels of government at most 5 percent of national income. n22 Compare that 
with today when all government expenditures account for more than one-third of the economy's total output. n23 
The national debt, for all intents and purposes, had been briefly but completely paid off in 1835, under President 
Andrew Jackson. n24 It had reemerged, mainly as a result of the Mexican War, but in 1860, it stood at a modest $ 65 
million - less than annual outlays in 1858. n25 What makes this doubly amazing is that there were only two sources of 
federal revenue at the time: a tariff, with relatively low duties because this was an era of expanding free trade; and the 
sale of public lands, on which Congress had been steadily reducing the price because of the growing appeal of 
homesteading. n26 In short, most Americans paid no taxes whatsoever directly to the central government. n27 Their only 
regular contact with representatives of national authority would have been through the United States Post Office - if 
they had any contact at all. n28 
[*596] Even the monetary system was significantly deregulated as a result of the prior Jacksonian "divorce" of 
banking and government at the national level. n29 There was no federally chartered central bank, and the Treasury, as 
much as feasible, avoided dealing with the many state-chartered banks. The only legally recognized money was specie, 
that is, gold and silver coins. Although banks were still regulated by the state governments, many states had instituted a 
de facto regime of quasi-free banking. The economy's currency consisted solely of state bank notes redeemable for 
specie on demand. Private competition thus regulated the circulation of paper money. Despite trumped-up charges of 
wildcat banking, it was by comparison a relatively stable and crisis-free monetary system, as attested to by the painless 
financing of the Mexican War from 1846 to 1848 and the unprecedented quiescence of monetary issues in national 
politics in the decade prior to the Civil War. n30 
II. The Impact of the Civil War 
The cost of waging the Civil War for the Union would ultimately average $ 1.75 million per day and reach a total of $ 
1.3 billion for 1865 alone. n31 Figure 1 shows federal spending climbing to 13 percent of GDP, but this may be an 
underestimate. Annual GDP figures during this early period must be interpolated between decennial census data, and so 
estimates vary. Moreover, the GDP figures used in the graph, from the work of Louis D. Johnston and Samuel H. 
Williamson, include Confederate output during the war, which understates the war burden unless Confederate 
government expenditures are included. n32 Earlier GDP estimates of Thomas Senior Berry would put national outlays in 
1865 at just under 15 percent of northern GDP, beginning to approach what the central government spends nowadays 
during peacetime. n33 It is hard to decide from which angle this statistic is more remarkable: that government spending 
rose from such infinitesimal lows almost to today's heights in only four years, or that today's federal authorities [*597] 
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regularly spend more than they did during the most expensive year of the country's bloodiest war. n34 
How did the administration of President Abraham Lincoln finance this enormous increase? No one needs to be 
reminded that government cannot create resources out of thin air. There are four potential ways of funding government 
expenditures, three of which are primary. n35 The least important is government sale of goods and services; the same 
way private individuals and business raise funds. The Post Office, after all, sells stamps, the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture sells pamphlets, and the state of California sells lottery tickets (with a monopoly that suppresses market 
competition). n36 Although we have already observed that the sale of public land was one of two sources of national 
revenue prior to the Civil War, selling goods and services is not normally a major source of government revenue. n37 
The three primary ways of paying for government expenditures are (1) current taxes; (2) government borrowing, 
which is equivalent to future taxes, since even if the government's debt is never paid off, the present value of all future 
interest payments is roughly equal to the total value of the debt; and (3) the issuing of money, which generates inflation 
and an implicit tax on people's cash balances, as money's purchasing power declines. n38 The technical term that 
economists use for this last source of revenue is seigniorage, from the French word for feudal lord, because in medieval 
France it was the lord who had a monopoly on the mint and appropriated seigniorage. n39 
The Civil War's unprecedented expenditures struck at the very moment that the Union's anticipated revenues fell. 
n40 Although the outgoing Congress had raised tariff rates even before Lincoln assumed the presidency, it was clear that 
the Treasury Department was not going to be able to collect any duties from the South in the foreseeable future. n41 
Meanwhile, a [*598] Homestead Act finally passed Congress in 1862, implementing the Republican Party's promise 
that settlers get free title to 160 acres of government land after five years of settlement. n42 
Lincoln's Secretary of the Treasury, Salmon Portland Chase, had been an abolitionist and a former Democrat. n43 
The latter fact meant that he had a strong dislike for governmental control of the economy; he despised government 
debt, paper money, and internal taxes. n44 A good government in Chase's eyes was a frugal government, yet he was 
forced to resort to a mixture of all the financial expedients that he disliked. n45 In 1861, Congress implemented a direct 
tax of $ 20 million on real estate; although this tax was to be administered by the individual state governments, n46 it 
was the first internal tax Americans had paid to Washington City in forty-four years. n47 However, the more extensive 
Internal Revenue Act passed by Congress one year later was not administered through the states but by the newly 
established Commission of Internal Revenues. n48 Rather than recite all the myriad details of this and other Union 
revenue measures, it suffices to quote James G. Blaine, an up-and-coming Maine Republican, who called it "one of the 
most searching, thorough, comprehensive systems of taxation ever devised by any Government." n49 
In addition to all-encompassing excise, sales, and license taxes, the Internal Revenue Act of 1862 also introduced 
stamp taxes on most legal documents and an inheritance tax. n50 Collection required the creation of an extensive 
Internal Revenue bureaucracy reaching into every hamlet and town. n51 Even more significant was a national income 
tax. Although the income tax authorized in August 1861 was never actually collected, more stringent legislation, passed 
in July 1862, provided the [*599] government its first ever revenues from that source. n52 The tax ultimately covered 
all annual incomes over $ 600 (as low as $ 6,000 in today's prices) at graduated rates from three to seven and a half 
percent. n53 To ensure compliance, the government adopted a British practice and withheld money from people's 
income when it could. n54 With all these measures, the United States achieved higher taxation per capita than any other 
nation by the end of the Civil War. n55 But all the new and old taxes combined were just sufficient to cover about 
one-fifth of the Civil War's monetary cost, as indicated in Figure 3. n56 
[SEE FIGURE 3 IN ORIGINAL] 
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Fig. 3 
Meanwhile, borrowing covered about two-thirds of the war's cost. n57 Chase floated some loans directly to the general 
public, with the aid of an extravagant publicity campaign handled by private financier, Jay Cooke. n58 For most of its 
borrowing, however, the Union had to rely on banks, and this required that Congress undermine the restraints built into 
the antebellum financial system. n59 The Treasury's initial war loan of $ 150 million had put a heavy strain on those 
northern banks that had subscribed. n60 Once the financial community realized that the war would not be quick or easy, 
Treasury securities dropped in value. n61 As gold reserves drained from the bank vaults, state [*600] governments 
permitted the banks to suspend specie payments in December of 1861. n62 
In order to harness banking more tightly to the war effort and create a market for the Treasury's debt, the 
Republicans drafted the National Currency Acts of 1863 and 1864. n63 These acts fashioned a network of nationally 
chartered banks, still with us today, regulated by a new federal Comptroller of the Currency, an official still with us 
today as well. n64 National banks could issue bank notes supplied to them by the Comptroller, but only if they 
purchased a roughly equivalent value of war bonds. n65 To ensure the national banks did not suffer competition from 
state-chartered banks, Congress imposed a 10 percent tax in 1865 on the face value of all state banknotes. n66 State 
banks were henceforth confined to providing other financial services. n67 
Finally, roughly 15 percent of the war's financial outlay was covered through the first fiat money issued since the 
Constitution's ratification. n68 In early 1862, Congress passed the Legal Tender Act, empowering Secretary Chase to 
issue a form of paper bills that became popularly known as Greenbacks. n69 The final total of Greenbacks put into 
circulation reached $ 431 million, supplemented by a small quantity of interest-bearing notes and other currency. n70 All 
this government paper coupled with the private bank notes doubled the Union's money stock by 1863. n71 The 
consequent inflation put specie at a premium. n72 Greenback dollars had fallen in July of 1864 to a low of 35 cents' 
worth of gold. n73 While gold circulated at a premium over Greenbacks in the northeast, Greenbacks were only accepted 
at a discount from gold on the west coast. n74 
Adjusting for inflation, workers' wages actually fell by one-third in the North, and economic historians are still 
debating [*601] how much of that was due to heavy taxes versus high seigniorage. n75 Furthermore, the Greenbacks 
were made legal tender for all payments, public and private, except tariff duties and interest on the Treasury's debt. n76 
This led to one of the most astonishing cases of intellectual honesty on the part of a public official, when five years after 
the war had ended, Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase implicitly branded his prior actions as Secretary of the Treasury 
unconstitutional in the Hepburn decision. n77 However, soon after, President Ulysses Grant packed the Court so that it 
effectively reversed itself the following year. n78 
Figure 3 also reveals that Confederate States of America - being smaller and poorer than the Union - had to rely 
much more heavily on seigniorage for war finance. The two percentages for Confederate taxation reflect the fact that 
formal taxes raised only 7 percent of the war's cost, whereas informal taxation through direct military seizures along 
with some donations raised another 17 percent. n79 The combined total thus actually exceeded the proportion for Union 
taxation, but the ability of the Confederacy to borrow fell far short of the Union's. n80 The Confederate Treasury 
ultimately issued over $ 1 billion worth of currency, covering more than half the war's cost to the South. n81 The Union 
blockade and an additional $ 45 million in paper currency issued by individual southern states contributed to the 
monetary depreciation. n82 Southerners therefore suffered from hyperinflation, with prices rising by 2,675 percent from 
1860 to 1865, compared with 90.5 percent in the North. n83 
[*602] 
III. Comparisons 
Upon defeat of the Confederacy at the end of the war, the U.S. government's debt had climbed from just under $ 65 
million to nearly $ 2.8 billion. n84 The interest alone on this debt commanded about 40 percent of the central 
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government's outlays into the mid-1870s (as compared with less than 10 percent today). n85 To their credit, the post 
Civil War administrations ran an unbroken string of twenty-eight annual budget surpluses from the war's end to the 
depression of 1893, despite also cutting taxes. n86 This decline can be observed in Figure 4, which shows the national 
debt as a percent of GDP. n87 
[SEE FIGURE 4 IN ORIGINAL] 
Fig. 4 
The trajectory of the national debt in Figure 4 provides additional confirmation of Bourne's maxim, "War is the health 
of the State." All the major and minor spikes in the debt up through World War II, except for the rise during the Great 
Depression, are associated with wars. n88 The national debt reaches its highest level during World War II, at about 110 
[*603] percent of GDP. n89 The graph also helps to illustrate two other important relationships. Prior to World War II, 
there were four significant periods of debt reduction: post-American Revolution, post-War of 1812, post-Civil War, and 
post-World War I. n90 Each period was also one of tax cuts. n91 While raising taxes to balance the budget may be good 
accounting, it appears to be bad politics. The only exception is the decline of the national debt as a percent of GDP 
following World War II. n92 While there were some tax cuts under Presidents Harry Truman and John Kennedy, the 
main factor eroding the debt was high inflation, peaking in the late 1970s at double-digits. n93 In fact, the rise in 
government debt as a percent of GDP under President Ronald Reagan had as much to do with the Federal Reserve's 
taming of inflation as with his fiscal policies. n94 
A second relationship reflected in Figure 4 is the fact that, prior to the Great Depression, the general rule 
throughout the developed world was that governments always ran budget surpluses, except during wars or inadvertently 
during depressions. n95 This was true of the U.S. government until the Great Depression and the subsequent triumph of 
Keynesian economics. n96 In the eighty years since 1929, in contrast, the federal government has managed only twelve 
surpluses: four under Truman after World War II, three under President Dwight Eisenhower, one under President 
Richard Nixon, and four under President Bill Clinton, after the ending of the Cold War. n97 The War on Terror has 
simply started to bring the national debt as a percent of GDP back up to Cold War levels. n98 
It is also instructive to compare Civil War finance with the financing of three other major wars displayed in Figure 
5. Finance of the American Revolution stands as a precursor to Confederate finance, with a similar low level of formal 
taxation (6 percent), heavy reliance on seigniorage (75 percent), and [*604] resulting hyperinflation. n99 On the other 
hand, the proportions during World War I are almost identical to those of the Union during the Civil War. n100 In both 
cases, seigniorage covered about 15 percent of the war's cost. n101 The resulting cumulative inflation during World War 
I was more severe, however, ranking as the highest the U.S. had experienced up to that time (outside of the 
Confederacy) since the American Revolution. n102 
LE# 
Fig. 5 
One difference between the Civil War and World War I was how the fiat money was generated. Greenbacks were 
simple fiat money, printed by the Treasury and used directly to make government purchases. n103 But the Federal 
Reserve (Fed) was set up in 1914, shortly before U.S. entry into World War I, and it replaced Treasury-issued fiat 
money with central bank-issued fiat money. n104 The process is a bit more difficult to understand but works out the 
same financially. The Fed simply creates money out of thin air and loans it to the Treasury, which in turns spends it. 
n105 Or in the case of World War I, the Fed actually loaned money to private banks so long as they purchased Treasury 
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securities, re-loaning the created money to the [*605] Treasury. n106 The Treasury pays interest directly or indirectly to 
the Fed for these loans but the Fed, after covering its operating expenses, has rebated around 90 percent of these interest 
payments back to the Treasury. n107 The one thing that does change under a central bank is who is in charge of issuing 
fiat money, and the resulting incentives. n108 
World War II finance stands out for two reasons. Seigniorage covered nearly a quarter of the war's cost, the highest 
percentage for any U.S. war outside of the two hyperinflations: the American Revolution and the Confederacy. n109 By 
pegging the interest rate on Treasuries at very low rates (2.5 percent for long-term Treasury bonds, and 0.375 percent 
for short-term Treasury bills), the Fed automatically monetized much of the World War II debt. n110 The total money 
stock tripled and inflation became so rampant that the government imposed comprehensive wage and price controls, 
along with rationing, when the inevitable shortages resulted. n111 This heavy reliance on seigniorage undermines the 
widely believed myth that it was wartime deficit financing that finally ended the Great Depression. n112 What looked 
like fiscal policy was really monetary policy in disguise. 
Taxation covered another 40 percent of World War II's cost, the highest percentage for any major U.S. war until the 
Cold War. n113 This was mainly achieved by expanding the coverage of the income tax, which furnished three-fourths 
of all wartime tax receipts. n114 Despite major peacetime tax hikes under both Presidents Herbert Hoover and Franklin 
Roosevelt, only 4 million Americans were touched by the national income tax as late as 1939. n115 Five years later the 
number was around 42 million. n116 It was F.D.R. and World War II that brought income taxes to the common man. 
n117 
[*606] 
IV. Lessons? 
The impact of the War on Terror on government finance can be gleaned from Figure 6, which depicts both federal 
expenditures and receipts as a percent of GDP from 1940 to 2008. n118 The end of the Cold War brought a modest 
decline of expenditures from a high of 23 percent to less than 19 percent of GDP, bestowing the peace dividend of the 
Clinton years. n119 The wars in Afghanistan (2001-present) and Iraq (2003-present) have merely pushed spending back 
up toward Cold War levels. n120 More striking is the behavior of federal revenue, which shows far greater consistency 
than expenditures, having bumped up against 20 percent of GDP since the Korean War, for well over half a century. 
n121 That is quite an astonishing statistic when you think about all the changes in the tax code over the intervening 
years. Tax rates go up, tax rates go down, and the total bite out of the economy remains relatively constant. n122 This 
suggests that 20 percent is some kind of structural-political limit for federal taxes within the United States. It also 
suggests that variations in the deficit resulted primarily from changes in spending rather than in taxes. 
[SEE FIGURE 6 IN ORIGINAL] 
Fig. 6 
[*607] Another implication of Figure 6 is that throughout the post-World War II period, taxes have covered the 
greater portion of national spending. All the acrimonious political debates about the size of the deficit have been 
squabbles about marginal items. The deficit never exceeded 6 percent of GDP and was usually far less, leaving little 
room for reliance on either government borrowing or seigniorage. n123 In fact, seigniorage has become an utterly trivial 
source of government revenue, not just in the United States but also throughout the developed world. n124 This is partly 
a consequence of globalization, in which international competition between central banks restrains their monetary 
expansions n125 and partly the result of sophisticated financial systems, with fractional reserve banking, in which most 
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of the money that people actually use is created privately by banks and other financial institutions rather than by 
government. n126 Consider how little of your own cash balances are held in the form of Federal Reserve notes and 
Treasury coin versus in the form of bank deposits and money market funds. Such privately created money, even when 
its quantity expands, provides no seigniorage. Consequently, during America's Great Inflation of the 1970s, seigniorage 
accounted for only 2 percent of federal revenue, which translates into less than half a percent of GDP. n127 
Unlike the War on Terror, the current financial crisis appears destined to have a gargantuan impact on government 
finance. The critical date was Thursday, September 18, 2008, when the interest rate on Treasury bills temporarily went 
negative, accompanied by the misbehavior of other credit market indicators. n128 This was what caused Fed Chairman 
Ben Bernanke and Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson to hit the panic button. n129 Up until this point, the Fed had 
conducted various bailouts, Bear Stearns being the most prominent, but had not [*608] allowed those actions to affect 
the money stock. n130 In Fed speak, the interventions had been sterilized. n131 But after September 18, the monetary 
base, which consists of government created money directly controlled by the Fed, went through the roof. n132 
[SEE FIGURE 7 IN ORIGINAL] 
Fig. 7 
Figure 7 shows the behavior of the monetary base since the Great Inflation and before the current crisis, mostly under 
Fed Chair Alan Greenspan. n133 The base has two components: (a) [*609] currency and coin in the hands of the 
general public and (b) reserves held by banks and other depository institutions. Between 1986 and 2005, the total base 
grew at a steady rate of under 6.5 percent annually. n134 But nearly all of the growth was concentrated in currency, 
much of which was going abroad. n135 The Fed estimates that the proportion of U.S. currency held by foreigners rose 
from 25 to 50 percent over these nineteen years. n136 As a result total bank reserves were almost constant. n137 
[SEE FIGURE 8 IN ORIGINAL] 
Fig. 8 
Figure 8 brings base growth forward to the present. n138 Talk about a "hockey stick," over the mere three months after 
September 18 the base doubled, from $ 850 billion to $ 1.7 trillion. n139 Almost all of that increase was concentrated in 
bank reserves, which during that short period exploded by an incredible factor of thirteen. n140 Moreover, the Fed's 
balance sheet [*610] grew even larger, as depicted in Figure 9. n141 It peaked at $ 2.3 trillion in December 2008, as the 
Treasury loaned over half a trillion of newly borrowed money to the Fed, which turned around and loaned it to foreign 
central banks through currency swaps. n142 The Fed's balance sheet has since fallen back down to $ 1.8 trillion as of 
February 11, 2009, but that is still more than twice its size less than half a year ago. n143 
[SEE FIGURE 9 IN ORIGINAL]
 
Page 9 
12 Chap. L. Rev. 591, *610 
Fig. 9 
Under normal circumstances, such a massive and sudden monetary expansion would bring both high inflation and great 
seigniorage. However, these are not normal circumstances, and so far we have seen neither. Whether the Fed's actions 
will ultimately bring inflation or not is still an open question that [*611] depends largely on its ability to reverse course 
as the new money begins to circulate throughout the economy. However, a virtually unnoticed change in the Fed's 
operations ensures that its actions will not contribute much seigniorage to federal finance. Buried within the bailout bill 
enacted on October 3, 2008, setting up the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), was a provision permitting the Fed 
to pay interest on bank reserves. n144 The Fed did so, and currently the interest that banks earn on their reserves is set at 
the Fed's target interest rate for Federal funds. n145 
This seemingly technical change not only gives banks an incentive to just hold reserves rather than loan them out ­
thereby dampening increases in bank created money and in the price level - but it also essentially converts reserves into 
more government debt. n146 Paper fiat money, whether in the form of Greenbacks or Federal Reserve notes, earns no 
interest and therefore allows the government to purchase real resources without incurring any future tax liability. n147 
Currency and coin will continue to earn no interest and therefore be a minor source of government seigniorage. n148 But 
with the Fed having to divert potential government revenue to pay interest on the base money held by banks, 
seigniorage, already trivial, has virtually been eliminated as a source of future funding. n149 And this constraint will 
become tighter as the general public continues to replace its use of currency with reliance upon bank debit cards and 
other forms of electronic fund transfers. n150 
In short, the U.S. government is now virtually confined to only two sources of revenue: (1) current taxes and (2) 
borrowing, which represents future taxes. Furthermore, this restriction arises at a moment when government 
expenditures are programmed to soar upward. n151 Even before the current financial crisis, the aging of the baby 
boomers portended unprecedented [*612] increases in Social Security and Medicare. n152 Now add to that a $ 700 
billion TARP, President Barack Obama's nearly $ 800 fiscal stimulus, plus whatever additional money Congress 
appropriates for further financial bailouts. n153 Federal expenditures could therefore realistically rise from a little over 
one-fifth of GDP to over one-third within a single year. Some of these expenditures, particularly the TARP, will 
supposedly be reversed after the financial crisis is over. n154 But others will surely join social insurance in permanently 
ratcheting up the total. 
Before jumping too hastily to the conclusion that Bourne's maxim has become obsolete - with financial crises now 
replacing war as the health of the State - recall the 20-percent-of-GDP ceiling on total federal tax receipts that has 
proved binding for over half a century. The barrier may only be breachable during a truly major war, such as the Civil 
War or World War II, and even during the height of World War II, when the proportion of federal tax revenue was at its 
highest for all of U.S. history, it never reached even 25 percent of GDP. n155 The prospects are therefore sobering. 
Everyone knows that there is a limit to how much debt an individual or institution can pile on if future income is rigidly 
fixed. 
Although many governments around the world have experienced sovereign defaults, U.S. Treasury securities have 
long been considered entirely risk free. n156 Yet that may be changing already. Economists have started considering a 
possible Treasury default, while the business news media and investment rating agencies have begun openly discussing 
a potential risk premium on the interest rate that the U.S. government must pay. n157 The premiums of the much (and 
unfairly) maligned credit default swaps recently raised the probability of a U.S. Treasury default from a 1 percent 
chance over the next 10 years to a 6 percent chance. n158 The market for credit default swaps prices the default risk on 
the bonds of some [*613] European governments still higher. n159 War, not only the health of the State, can of course 
bring about the demise of a State, as the Confederate example reminds us. n160 We can only begin to wonder whether 
fiscal crises will bring the demise of the modern welfare State. 
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